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ESSAY
ISLAMIC LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS:
GOOD, BAD, AND UNSUSTAINABLE USES
EUN-JUNG KATHERINE KIM*
A number of states have proposed initiatives or implemented laws that pro-
hibit state courts from applying, considering, or interpreting foreign law, and in
particular, Islamic law.  The constitutionality of anti-Sharia legislation is in
question.  Its proponents claim that the Sharia ban protects state and federal
constitutional rights, whereas its opponents claim that the ban infringes on the
religious freedom of Muslims. The all-or-nothing approach to anti-Sharia legisla-
tion misses the distinction between cases where Islamic law should be given con-
sideration from the cases where it should have no influence on judicial decision.
This Essay provides a principled distinction between the different uses of Islamic
law and shows how the courts can preserve a balance among religious liberty and
other constitutional rights.  By applying three principles—neutrality, reciprocity,
and protection—derived from the core commitments of a liberal democratic soci-
ety, this Essay explains the distinction between good, bad, and unsustainable
uses of Islamic law in American courts: (1) good use where the judge’s applica-
tion, consideration or interpretation of Islamic law should be sustained; (2) bad
use where the grounds that render the use unsustainable may be overridden by
other considerations; and (3) unsustainable use that lacks overriding considera-
tions. This Essay offers a way to avoid the undesirable consequences of a strict
ban or an unrestricted permission on Sharia use by applying the three principles
to a number of cases involving Islamic law reviewed by American courts.
INTRODUCTION
A newlywed Muslim couple from Morocco appeared at a New
Jersey court in 2008.  The wife sought a restraining order against her
husband, who had repeatedly raped her.  The judge refused to order
protection for the wife on grounds that a wrongful intent, which is nec-
essary for sexual assault, could not be identified.  According to the
* Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Wayne State University.  Ph.D.,
University of Washington; M.A., University of Washington; B.A., University of Southern
California. I am grateful to William Talbott and Lawrence Lombard for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.  I also want to thank Brad Roth, Azizah Y. al-Hibri and
the audiences of Advancing Public Philosophy Conference at Emory University and the
29th International Social Philosophy Conference for stimulating discussions of the paper.
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judge, the husband was operating under the religious precepts of Islam,
which permitted him to have coerced sex with his wife.1
Judicial decisions that rely on Islamic law—and as a result, violate
the rights of litigants—have led to support for legislation that prohibits
U.S. state courts from applying, considering, or interpreting Islamic
law.  A number of states have proposed initiatives or implemented laws
that bar judges from using foreign judgment as precedent or enforcing
foreign law that violates state or federal constitutional rights.2  “Anti-
Sharia” legislation received national attention when the voters of
Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment stating that “the courts
shall not consider international or Sharia Law.”3  A federal court
blocked the amendment on grounds that banning Sharia law from legal
proceedings would undermine religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment.4  Despite the court’s decision, a number of state legisla-
tures have approved the Sharia ban in light of notorious cases where
the courts applied Sharia law or enforced a foreign judicial decision
that resulted in violation of rights.
There is a clear divide in the legal community regarding the consti-
tutionality of anti-Sharia legislation.  Its proponents claim that legislat-
ing against Sharia use in American courts would preserve fundamental
American values of liberty and freedom, and would protect the consti-
tutional rights of Muslims residing in the United States.5  The absence
of the ban can deprive Muslims (and non-Muslims) of their constitu-
tional protections, an absurd consequence reflected in the New Jersey
rape case.  On the other hand, the opponents of the Sharia ban argue
that it infringes on the civil liberties and religious freedom of Muslims.6
Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment violates not only the First
1. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).  The decision was
reversed on appeal. Id. at 428.
2. Since 2010, two dozen states have proposed legislation that prohibits judges from
considering foreign or international law in American courts.  Varying forms of anti-Sharia
legislation include H.R. 2379, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H.R. 79, 2012 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.R. 785, 2010 Leg., 10RS-899 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.R. 1253,
2012 Legis. Assemb., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012); H.R. 3768, 106th  Gen. Assemb., 2009-2010
Sess. (Tenn. 2010).  Idaho’s state legislature passed a non-binding resolution: H.R. 44,
60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010).
3. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010).
4. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012).
5. See American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpoli-
cyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014);
CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE COURT CASE 8 (2012); Robert Spencer, The Necessity of Anti-Sharia Laws, AMERI-
CAN THINKER (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/03/the_neces-
sity_of_anti-sharia_laws.html.
6. See Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign
Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L., 107, 107–12  (2012). See generally Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers
of Anti-Sharia Laws, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/article/
2012/02/the-dangers-of-anti-sharia-laws; Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma State
Question 755 and An Analysis of Anti-International Law Initiatives, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/
default/files/davis_and_kalb_anti-international_law.pdf.
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Amendment, but also three other clauses of the federal Constitution.7
Further, the legal consequences of implementing the Sharia ban are
unacceptable.  Prohibiting judges from considering foreign law con-
flicts with established legal principles and practices, including defer-
ence to foreign judgments “when resolving family law, estate, or
contract disputes involving the activities of Americans while abroad or
of foreign nationals living in the United States.”8  By taking an all-or-
nothing approach to anti-Sharia legislation, the two opposing camps
often miss the distinction between cases where Islamic law should be
given consideration and cases where it should have no influence on
judicial decision.
This Essay provides a principled distinction between the different
uses of Islamic law to show how the courts can preserve a balance
among religious liberty and other constitutional rights.  A strict ban
that prohibits judges from using Sharia in their rulings would under-
mine a litigant’s right to religious freedom, whereas a blanket permis-
sion that gives total discretion to judges can lead to the absurd
consequence that a litigant’s basic right to physical security is not
enforced.  By applying three principles—neutrality, reciprocity, and
protection—derived from the core commitments of a liberal demo-
cratic society, this Essay explains the distinction between good, bad, and
unsustainable uses of Islamic law in American courts.  Part I discusses
the good use of Islamic law, where the judge’s application, considera-
tion, or interpretation of Islamic law should be sustained; Part II dis-
cusses the bad use where the grounds that render the use unsustainable
may be overridden by other considerations; and Part III discusses the
unsustainable use that lacks overriding considerations.  This Essay
offers a way to avoid the undesirable consequences of a strict ban or an
unrestricted permission on Sharia use by applying the three principles
to a number of cases involving Islamic law adjudicated in American
courts.
The three principles are offered as a guide for judges in applying,
considering, and interpreting Islamic law rather than acting as neces-
sary and sufficient conditions that determine the three categories of
use.  The purpose of articulating the three principles is to guide both
the legal community and the public in evaluating the uses of Islamic law
in American courts.  The application of the principles of neutrality, rec-
iprocity, and protection to particular cases shows that using Islamic law
in the courts can protect important rights in some cases but violate
rights in others.  A nuanced understanding of the different uses will
7. In addition to the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, it has been claimed that Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment violates the Con-
tracts Clause of Article I, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.
See N.Y. CITY BAR COMM. ON FOREIGN & COMP. L., THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
OKLA. REFERENDUM 755 – THE “SAVE OUR STATE AMENDMENT” 2 (2010), available at http:/
/www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072027-UnconstitutionalityofOklahomaRefer-
endum755.pdf.
8. Davis & Kalb, supra note 6, at 8.
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correct the misunderstanding that all uses of Islamic law in American
courts threaten rights, which motivates the public effort to reduce judi-
cial discretion and approve anti-Sharia legislation.
I. GOOD USE: NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE
In 2001, the Islamic Center of Little Rock (ICLR) hired Monir El-
Farra, an imam or Islamic minister, under an employment contract.  It
provided that ICLR could terminate the contract “on valid grounds
according to Islamic Jurisdiction (Shari’a)” upon sixty days’ notice.9  In
2002, some members of ICLR expressed grievances against El-Farra
regarding his sermons, conduct that “contradicts the Islamic law,” and
interference in ICLR’s administration.10  After an in-house arbitration
and two warning letters stating concerns and requirements for improve-
ment, ICLR voted to terminate El-Farra with a payment for sixty days.11
El-Farra filed a complaint against ICLR for defamation and breach of
contract.  The Circuit Court of Arkansas dismissed El-Farra’s complaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.12  The Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas affirmed that the First Amendment prohibited the court’s exercise
of jurisdiction in the matter because it would require an inquiry into a
religious doctrine to determine whether El-Farra’s conduct violated the
principles that govern an Islamic organization.13
In El-Farra v. Sayyed, the court recognized broad protections for the
internal activities of religious organizations against governmental inter-
ference.14  The decision falls under the “ministerial exception,” a doc-
trine rooted in the First Amendment that prevents employees who
perform a religious function from suing their employers (i.e., religious
organizations) over most employment disputes.15  The Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment provides that religious organizations
have the right to choose and discipline their employees who perform
religious functions, and the Establishment Clause prevents the courts
from reviewing cases dealing with ecclesiastical disputes.16  In El-Farra,
the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the “federal courts have repeat-
edly concluded that any attempt by civil courts to limit a religious insti-
tution’s choice of its religious representatives would constitute an
impermissible burden upon that institution’s First Amendment
9. El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. El-Farra v. Sayyed, 2005 WL 4718371, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005).
13. El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792 (Ark. 2006).
14. Id. at 794.
15. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328,
331 (4th Cir. 1997).
16. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Emp’t Oppor-
tunity Comm’n 132 S.Ct. 694, 702-07 (2012).  For a discussion of the ministerial excep-
tion in contract cases following Hosanna-Tabor, see Kevin J. Murphy, Note, Administering
the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor: Why Contract Claims Should Not be Barred, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2014).
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rights.”17  The hiring and firing of an imam are activities included in
the protected sphere of religious organizations and the courts cannot
override ecclesiastical decisions that compose the protected sphere.  A
judgment on whether an imam fulfilled the mission of the religious
organization would involve using Islamic law as the basis of the assess-
ment.  A court’s application of non-neutral principles derived from a
religious doctrine would be an illegitimate interference into the inter-
nal matters of a religious organization.  A legal practice that gives
weight to a secular court’s assessment of the fit between a religious doc-
trine and the decision of a religious organization would merge—rather
than separate—church and State.18
The court’s decision in El-Farra represents a good use of Islamic
law because it is compatible with—and further supports—a constitu-
tional right, in particular, the right to religious liberty.19  The court rec-
ognized that Islamic doctrine is the proper source of governing
principles for an organization that congregates people who pursue a
corporate life guided by religious precepts.  It should be noted that the
compatibility between a court’s use of Islamic law and United States law
does not amount to their convergence on a legal rule or principle.
Rather, Islamic law is relevant to the El-Farra decision in the following
two ways: (1) the court’s recognition of the authority of Islamic law in
governing a specific activity (e.g., an employment decision) within a
religious organization; and (2) the inclusion of the activity within the
protected sphere of religious organizations according to state, federal,
or constitutional law.  A court’s inquiry into Islamic law to determine
whether an employment contract has been breached would invade the
protected sphere of a religious organization.  While the enforcement of
a contract that requires intrusion into the internal matters of ICLR
would undermine religious liberty, there are obvious limits to the range
of activities permitted for the sake of religious liberty.  For example,
religious organizations are prohibited from disciplining their members
with the means of physical punishment.  Granting authority to Islamic
law over activities excluded from the protected sphere of a religious
organization would fail to constitute a good use of Islamic law.
A court promotes religious liberty through both non-enforcement
and enforcement of Islamic law.  In El-Farra, the court’s recognition of
the authority of Islamic law in the protected sphere of ICLR required
non-enforcement.  However, there are cases in which non-enforcement
would undermine religious liberty.  A court might protect an individ-
ual’s religious liberty by enforcing a valid contract or probating a will
that incorporates the requirements of Islamic law.  In Awad v. Ziriax,
17. See El-Farra, 226 S.W.3d at 794.
18. To distinguish the sovereign political entity (recognized in international law
and organized under a government) from sub-entities, “State” refers to the former and
“state” refers to the fifty states of the United States.
19. I am borrowing Will Kymlicka’s distinction between good, bad, and intolerable
group rights.  My usage, however, differs from his original definitions in the sense that the
evaluative terms are applied not to rights but to the uses of Islamic law. See Will Kymlicka,
The Good, the Bad, and the Intolerable: Minority Group Rights, 33 DISSENT 22–30 (1996).
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Awad alleged that the proposed “Save Our State Amendment,” which
would bar Oklahoma state courts from considering Islamic law in mak-
ing judicial decisions, violated his free exercise rights.20  One of the
concerns raised against the proposal was that it would disable a court
from probating Awad’s will and testament, which incorporated by refer-
ence aspects of what SQ755 (“Save Our State Amendment”) defined as
Sharia Law.21  Awad claimed that the proposed amendment was “not
facially neutral” because it specifically prohibited the consideration of
Islamic law.  While the amendment would encroach upon the religious
liberty and property rights of Muslim citizens, the amendment would
safeguard for other citizens the same liberty and right against govern-
mental interference.  He claimed that the violation of neutrality, as
required by the Establishment Clause, would send an unmistakable
message that Muslims are religious and political outsiders in their own
State.22
The decisions in El-Farra and Awad reflect different aspects of the
neutrality requirement of the Establishment Clause: (1) the prohibition
of governmental interference in the protected sphere of religious orga-
nizations (the non-interference requirement exemplified in El-Farra)
and (2) the prohibition of showing preference for one religion over
another (the non-preference requirement in Awad).  The non-prefer-
ence requirement of neutrality prohibits institutions from granting a
privileged status to (or discriminating against) a particular religious
doctrine.  The State must refrain from exhibiting partiality by endors-
ing the values of a particular religious group while rejecting the values
of another group.  For example, a judge who considers a particular
religious doctrine but refuses to consider another religious doctrine in
his or her rulings would violate the non-preference requirement of neu-
trality.  A complaint in Awad was that Oklahoma’s constitutional
amendment “conveys an official government message of disapproval
and hostility toward his religious beliefs, that sends a clear message he is
an outsider, not a full member of the political community, thereby chil-
ling his access to the government . . . .”23  By prohibiting the courts
from enforcing contracts based on Islamic requirements, a Muslim citi-
zen’s values suffer institutional exclusion and thereby undermine his
status as a member of the political community.  A liberal democratic
society maintains institutional mechanisms that eliminate discrimina-
tion based on religious difference, and provides legal protections for
minority religious groups so that they are not disadvantaged in society
for carrying out religious activities within the protected sphere.24
State neutrality toward different religious doctrines has both moral
and epistemic significance in a liberal democratic society.  The moral
significance of neutrality is that it expresses respect for the moral equal-
20. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
21. Id. at 1304.
22. Id. at 1303.
23. Id.
24. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICUL-
TURALISM 32-40 (2001).
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ity of persons. A liberal democratic society recognizes the equal moral
status of persons by respecting their rational autonomy, i.e., the self-
governing capacity to make decisions based on reasons.  This liberal
commitment is expressed through the democratic process that gives cit-
izens an equal opportunity to shape the institutions that exercise coer-
cive power over them. The institutional recognition of moral equality
through a democratic process allows citizens to designate a limit to
coercive power and carve out a protected sphere within which they can
freely pursue their life projects.  The commitment to moral equality is
also reflected in the equal protection of religious liberty that allows citi-
zens to exercise their rational capacity to acquire (or reject) beliefs and
values from a range of options, including religious doctrines.  Under
liberal institutions, citizens enjoy the freedom to evaluate various beliefs
and engage in activities (e.g., worship) informed by those beliefs within
the protected sphere of non-interference.25
Institutions that guarantee freedoms necessary for the exercise of
rational autonomy should not discriminate against (or show prefer-
ences for) beliefs and related activities, as long as the activities do not
harm or encroach upon the protected sphere of others.  If a liberal
democratic society maintains institutions that protect the rational
autonomy of citizens, and at the same time discriminates against beliefs
or interferes in the activities that result from exercising rational auton-
omy, then the institutions fail to embody equal concern and respect for
citizens.  Further, the equal treatment of religious groups requires that
the values of a minority religious group that diverge from the majority
not be excluded from the political community.  Majority and minority
religious groups have equal standing in the political community; the
legal institution would not be justified in privileging the majority by
making demands according to their deep-seated beliefs, but ruling over
the minority with demands that conflict with their core beliefs.  Given
that the activities informed by both sets of beliefs belong in the pro-
tected sphere, the legal institution should correct rather than embody
unequal treatment of persons based on their beliefs.  Partiality toward
(or discrimination against) a particular religious group violates the
principle of moral equality that governs liberal institutions.26
State neutrality also has epistemic significance.  Under liberal insti-
tutions that protect religious liberty, citizens arrive at different conclu-
sions on the good and the true.  The principles of rationality do not
require that thoughtful persons agree on the answers to fundamental
questions.  The exercise of rational autonomy leads to a reasonable dis-
agreement on questions of religion—e.g., whether religious beliefs can
be justified and what is the correct interpretation of a religious doc-
trine.  Citizens of a liberal democratic society make different judgments
on these questions and the disagreement cannot be easily explained in
terms of ignorance or defective rational capacity.27  Reasonable disa-
25. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 47-58 (1st ed. 1993).
26. BARRY, supra note 24, at 24-32 (2001).
27. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54–55 (1st ed. 1993).
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greement is the expected result of liberal institutions and, hence, it
would be unjustifiable for the State to establish orthodoxy or to show
preference for a particular religious doctrine (the non-preference
requirement of neutrality).  Further, the State does not have rational
grounds to resolve the disagreement or assess the degrees of reasona-
bleness of the different religious doctrines and their interpretations.
Even if the State had privileged access to eternal truths, ranking the
doctrines would involve assigning differential rational capacities to citi-
zens who endorse them.  Given that the effort to eliminate or resolve a
reasonable disagreement on religious beliefs would result in the unjusti-
fiable use of power, the only option for a liberal democratic State is to
remain neutral between different religious doctrines by exercising epi-
stemic restraint, i.e. non-interference, in religious matters.28
II. BAD USE: RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE
In 2001, two Muslim citizens of India married in Andhra Pradesh,
moved to the United States, and had one child.  They lived in Michigan
for two years before their separation in 2008.  The husband returned to
India in April 2008, and performed the triple talaq, a method of divorce
under Muslim personal law by which a husband divorces his wife by
pronouncing “I divorce thee” three times.  In May 2008, the wife also
filed for divorce in Michigan.  The husband then filed a motion to dis-
miss the complaint by proving an existing divorce with a divorce certifi-
cate from Andhra Pradesh.  The trial court granted his motion but the
appellate court reversed by refusing to recognize the Indian divorce.
The appellate court held that the triple talaq is “violative of due process
and contrary to public policy” because the wife had no right to prior
notice of the triple talaq or to be present at the pronouncement.29 The
appellate court refused to grant comity to the Indian system by stating
that it makes “arbitrary and invidious” distinctions and thereby denies
equal protection of the law (women cannot initiate divorce with the
talaq).30
The disagreement between the trial and appellate courts in the
case above, Tarikonda v. Pinjari, shows that comity or deference to for-
eign law is a principle rather than a rule that “states a reason that
argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular deci-
sion.”31  There is a reason—e.g., reciprocity that governs international
relations—to recognize the validity and legal effects of foreign judicial
acts, but deference is not required.  Deference to foreign jurisdictions
must be weighed against the commitment to equal protection of the law
for individuals residing within the political territory. Tarikonda shows
that a court’s obligation to enforce the rights of persons under its pro-
tection overrides the obligation to enforce foreign judgments.32
28. Id. at 54.
29. Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009).
30. Id. at 4.
31. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26 (1978).
32. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895):
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The facts of Tarikonda give rise to an apparent conflict between
comity and equal protection of the law.  The case, however, demon-
strates a deeper moral conflict between religious liberty and moral
equality, the fundamental values of a liberal democratic society.  Equal
protection of the law is an institutional expression of moral equality
and comity is deference to foreign law, including religious law under
which the faithful voluntarily subject themselves.  On the one hand, a
U.S. court’s enforcement of a foreign judgment made under Islamic
law can undermine the fundamental value of moral equality.  Granted
that Islam—like many religions—is “tilted against women,” a U.S. court
might enforce a judgment that fails to give women equal concern and
respect.33  Gender inequality under Islamic law is a relevant considera-
tion in many decisions involving comity; the majority of cases involving
Islamic law reviewed by U.S. courts deal with family law (marriage,
divorce, child custody, and domestic violence).34  On the other hand,
the non-enforcement of foreign judgments rendered by Islamic courts
(or barring U.S. courts from considering Islamic law) might impose
undue restriction on religious liberty, and thereby, violate the First
Amendment.35
In the previous Part, it was argued that the values of equality and
neutrality are wedded in liberal theory.36  In application, however, the
two values may come apart or conflict in a civil court.  Suppose that a
state court reviews cases involving noncitizen litigants who are also sub-
ject to a foreign jurisdiction that fails to provide equal protection of the
law, or litigants who subscribe to a religious doctrine that rejects gender
equality.  In such cases, a court that aims to treat all persons as moral
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.
33. In addition to Tarikonda, there are other cases in which upholding a foreign
judgment resulted in violation of gender equality.  In Parveen Chaudry v. M. Hanif
Chaudry, M.D.  159 N.J. Super. 566 (1978), the Appellate Court overturned the Trial
Court and denied child support, equitable distribution of property and alimony.  Further,
the Appellate Court found the marriage contract—signed by the parents of the couple
under Pakistani law and which provided for only $1,500 towards the wife—was valid.
34. The Center for Security Policy compiled fifty cases from twenty-three states in
which Sharia was relevant to the judicial decision.  Most of the disputes are covered under
family law. Shariah Cases By State, SHARIAH IN AMERICAN COURTS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://
shariahinamericancourts.com/?page_id=305.
35. Awad v. Ziriax illustrates how the Sharia ban might violate First Amendment
protections.  In addition, the ban would conflict with other federal laws and policies.  For
example, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act establishes “recogni-
tion of the foreign country judgment” in order to meet “the increased needs for enforce-
ment of foreign country money-judgments.” See Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.
aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2014).  For conflict-of-laws consequences of the Sharia ban, see Aaron
Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J.  INT.
L. 107 (2012).
36. See supra Part I.
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equals by recognizing their right to equal protection of the law cannot
satisfy the non-interference and non-preference requirements of neu-
trality.  By recognizing moral equality, the court would fail in neutrality.
The commitment to treat all persons with equal concern and respect
can result in a court’s violation of the non-interference requirement by
exercising jurisdiction over cases (or refusing to recognize foreign judg-
ments) that leave women worse off based on religious reasons.  Or a
court might discriminate against a religious doctrine that explicitly
endorses gender inequality by refusing to consider the doctrine while
appealing to other religious doctrines that are consistent with gender
equality.  Alternatively, the commitment to neutrality might require a
court to recognize a foreign decision rendered by a religious jurisdic-
tion or permit a religious practice that undermines women’s moral sta-
tus and, thereby, the court would fail to recognize moral equality.
A bad use of Islamic law in American courts would undermine a
litigant’s rights as the result of applying, considering, or interpreting
Islamic law.  In Tarikonda, the trial court’s recognition of the Indian
divorce was a bad use of Islamic law because the court’s deference to a
foreign judicial act undermined the principle of equal protection of the
law.  Nonetheless, bad uses of Islamic law should not be eliminated as
an option for cases involving noncitizen litigants.  The courts have an
obligation to exercise restraint in applying coercive measures that inter-
fere in the personal sphere of noncitizens, who comprise the majority
of cases involving Islamic law.  The following argument for legal
restraint regarding noncitizens depends on “equality-based reciprocity”
(“reciprocity” for short) that governs democratic institutions.
A legitimate democratic State has the right to rule over citizens
through institutions that regard them as worthy of equal consideration.
And citizens have the obligation to respect the authority of the State by
complying with the demands of its institutions.  In a liberal democratic
society, legitimacy is a function of the reciprocal relationship between
the State and each citizen who is subject to its coercive institutions.37
Democratic institutions recognize the same fundamental status of all
citizens by giving them an equal opportunity to shape the institutions
that demand compliance and punish non-compliance.  The institu-
tional recognition of moral equality is reflected in the equal opportu-
nity to participate in decision-making.38  The right to political
participation recognizes the rational autonomy of citizens by inviting
them to design the institutions according to the values by which they
would govern their own lives.  The obligation to comply with the direc-
tives of liberal democratic institutions is grounded in the State’s recog-
nition of each member as equal to other members of the political
community.
On the other hand, noncitizens are denied full membership in the
political community.  They are not granted the right to vote; they are
37. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 272–73 (2d ed. 2011).
38. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUN-
DATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (2004).
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prohibited from effectively participating in the political process in a way
that can shape the institutions that govern their lives.  Because the State
does not recognize the noncitizens’claims about which values should be
embedded in the institutions that demand their compliance, the State
treats noncitizens differently from citizens.  Further, the State and
noncitizens fail to enjoy a relationship of reciprocity.  While noncitizens
are prohibited from imposing their own values on coercive institutions,
the State nonetheless demands their compliance with these institutions.
If reciprocity is important for legitimate coercion in a democratic soci-
ety, then the State should limit its exercise of power against noncitizens.
The limited reach into the lives of noncitizens implies enlarging their
protected sphere relative to that of citizens.  That is, the State should
exercise greater restraint in applying coercive measures by allowing
noncitizens to govern their lives according to their own deep-seated val-
ues.  For example, a civil court would exercise minimal intervention in
matters involving personal law by enforcing a judgment from the juris-
diction of the noncitizen’s home State, especially if it is a religious juris-
diction to which she voluntarily subjects herself.  Coercive institutions
of the receiving State should have minimal control over the private lives
of noncitizens because they are denied the opportunity to shape those
institutions.  Noncitizens should be protected from undue interference
that undermines their ability to pursue a conception of life according
to their own worldview—even if it conflicts with the values embodied in
the institutions of a liberal democratic society.
One might raise the objection that reciprocity between the receiv-
ing State and noncitizens is insignificant for legitimate coercion, even
for a liberal democratic State.  The entrance into a political territory
marks the noncitizen’s acceptance of the authority of the receiving
State, which has the right to impose duties and the conditions of resi-
dence.  By enjoying the benefits conferred by the receiving State, nonci-
tizens tacitly consent to its authority.39  (An important benefit of
residing in a liberal democratic State is the protection of rights; all per-
sons within the territorial boundaries of the United States are granted
most—but not all—constitutional rights.)  Consent may be an unlikely
basis for State legitimacy vis-a`-vis persons who are born into their politi-
cal community because they do not have the opportunity to express
their willingness to become a member.  However, outside persons who
cross the border to enter into a new political community commit an act
that should be understood as their willingness to obey the authority of
the receiving State.  The receiving State’s legitimacy vis-a`-vis the nonci-
tizen is derived from their consent rather than reciprocity.40  And
hence, the lack of equality-based reciprocity that treats noncitizens with
equal concern and respect does not limit the receiving State’s political
authority.  The objector might point out an additional basis for dis-
missing the significance of reciprocity for the receiving State’s exercise
39. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348 (Cambridge U. Press 1960).
40. Id.
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of legal authority: territorial jurisdiction gives the receiving State power
over noncitizens and the activities performed within its territory.
While the receiving State has the right to rule over all persons
residing in its territory, it is not an exclusive right; that is, the receiving
and home States share their authority over an individual.41  Consent to
be ruled by the receiving State does not amount to recognizing its
exclusive authority.  A noncitizen is not endowed with the power to
bestow upon the receiving State the exclusive right to rule over her.
The receiving State’s right to rule over a noncitizen is limited by the
special political relationship the individual has with the home State in
virtue of political membership.  The noncitizen’s home State has the
authority to impose certain duties as long as the individual remains a
member of the political community.42  And by implication, the receiv-
ing State shares its authority over the noncitizen.  The home State
retains its right to rule over a member who has left its territory because
the right supervenes on political membership rather than physical resi-
dence.  Political membership generates the right to rule (for the State)
and political obligations (for its members).43  For example, a member
who leaves the territory still shares the burden of mutual defense with
other members of the political community.  South Korean males, over
the age of 18, who are residents of the United States but citizens of the
Republic of Korea have an obligation to serve in its military (usually a
two-year service).44 There are consequences for failing to discharge this
duty (e.g., being forbidden from entering or leaving the Republic of
Korea).  The special political relationship permits the home State to
take coercive action in certain areas of an individual’s life even after he
or she has left the territory.  One cannot be completely free from the
laws of the home State through migration and remain bound to certain
duties against one’s wishes.
The State has legitimate authority to impose duties on members
who no longer reside in its territory, even if the duties are imposed
against their will and result in significant reduction of liberty (e.g., mili-
tary service).  The same authority should also have jurisdiction over a
limited range of non-criminal cases, especially if an individual invites
the home State’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute.  The rec-
ognition that some residents of the United States are subject to two
sovereign authorities sometimes involves enforcing foreign judgments
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. According to Article 39 [Duty to Military Service] of the Constitution of the
Republic of Korea,
“(1) All citizens shall have the duty of national defense under the conditions as pre-
scribed by Act.
(2) No citizen shall be treated unfavorably on account of the fulfillment of his obligation
of military service.” DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTIUTION] art. 39 (S. Kor.).
South Korean men who live abroad are subject to compulsory military service.  Military
Service Information for Conscription Candidates Overseas, MIL. MANPOWER ADMINISTRA-
TION, http://www.mma.go.kr/eng/s_notice/notice/1211661_2577.html (last visited
April 10, 2014).
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regarding disputes between noncitizens. As Tarikonda shows, deference
to a foreign court may result in sacrificing U.S. constitutional rights in
cases where one party wants to settle a dispute in a foreign court and
the other party files a complaint over the same matter in a U.S. state
court. The enforcement of a foreign decision based on Islamic law can
result in a rights violation, in which case the enforcement would
amount to a bad use of Islamic law in American courts.  Nonetheless,
the enforcement of foreign decisions that undermine the rights of a
noncitizen should be left to the discretion of judges who must recog-
nize that the United States shares its authority over noncitizens with
another State.
There are additional reasons for permitting bad uses of Islamic law
in American courts.  If judges were prohibited from enforcing decisions
rendered by foreign courts that fail to recognize a similar range of
rights as U.S. courts, then comity would be granted only to a limited
number of Western democratic States.  The lack of legal recognition of
foreign jurisdictions has been regarded as a failure to respect the judi-
cial decisions or laws of other States.  Political consequences (e.g. ten-
sion in U.S. foreign relations) may follow from refusing to respect
foreign jurisdictions.45
By applying the Reciprocity Principle to Tarikonda, I argued that
state courts should limit their authority over noncitizens in non-crimi-
nal cases.  Noncitizens are denied the opportunity to shape the institu-
tions that govern their lives, and thus, the institutions fail to treat
noncitizens with equal concern and respect.  The absence of reciprocity
is not the only reason for placing constraint on legal authority over
noncitizens; they are subject to two sovereign authorities as members of
one political community and residents of another.  Islamic law, how-
ever, is not merely foreign law that governs the members of other politi-
cal communities but also religious law that governs the personal lives of
Muslim-American citizens.  What would be the result of applying the
reciprocity principle to cases involving Muslim-American citizens over
whom the United States has exclusive authority rather than shared
authority?  In a liberal democratic society, the State’s claims of authority
depend on its equal treatment of citizens.  Muslim-American citizens
would have a general obligation to comply with coercive institutions
under the reciprocity principle because they enjoy an equal opportu-
nity to shape these institutions. Political institutions give expression to
equal concern and respect by protecting and enabling the exercise of
the equal right to political participation.
The legal institution of a liberal democratic society, as argued in
the previous section, satisfies moral equality by observing the non-inter-
ference and non-preference requirements of neutrality.  The appeal to
neutrality requirements, however, cannot always settle the question of
whether the courts have treated litigants as moral equals in disputes
involving religious matters.  The following two cases involve disputes
between Muslim-Americans who voluntarily entered into Islamic mar-
45. See Davis & Kalb, supra note 6, at 9.
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riage contracts with similar provisions that appear to undermine gender
equality.  The two U.S. courts adjudicating the disputes rendered con-
flicting judgments on the enforceability of the contracts.  In the rest of
this section, I will provide an explanation of the disagreement between
the courts based on their divergent understandings of what is required
by equal concern and respect.  The court opinions indicate that one
court believed that moral equality requires gender equality, whereas the
other court believed that the protection of autonomy is central to equal
concern and respect.
In Jabri v. Qaddura, a husband and wife signed an Islamic marriage
contract, “Islamic Society of Arlington Islamic Marriage Certificate,”
which provided that the “dowry for the bride” was “[o]ne-half of the
value of the house located at 2206 Gladstone.46  This is in addition to
$40,000 Fourty [sic] Thousand U.S. Dollars the payment of which is
deferred.”47  The wife filed for divorce and sought enforcement of the
Islamic Marriage Certificate.  The trial court found that the “purported
Islamic Dowry agreement” was not “a valid or qualified premarital
agreement under the Texas Family Code.”48  There are at least two pos-
sible grounds for the trial court’s judgment that rendered the contract
unenforceable.  One possibility is that enforcing the contract would vio-
late the First Amendment’s non-interference requirement of neutral-
ity.49  The contract was signed under the religious authority of the
Islamic Society of Arlington and contained provisions in accordance
with the requirements of Islamic marriage law.  The court would have
to apply non-neutral principles of a religious doctrine to determine the
performance of the contract, and hence, the court is not the proper
agent for its enforcement.  This possibility, however, can be ruled out.
Rather than stating that the case lies beyond the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, the trial court rendered the contract invalid based on its
provisions.50
A second possibility is that the contract’s provisions were contrary
to public policy.  The court may have believed that the contract
assigned a purchase value to the bride and undermined her moral sta-
tus.  The court’s misunderstanding of the “deferred payment” to the
bride mostly likely led to the judgment that the contract was invalid.
There is reason to believe that the court confused dowry with bride
price, which serve different functions.  A dowry is a package of goods,
like cash or property, which the bride brings to the marriage, whereas
the bride price is money paid by the groom to the bride’s family.51  The
function of a dowry is to establish the woman’s position in her new
46. Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating the First Amendment
“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers).
50. Jabri, 108 S.W.3d at 407.
51. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961, 21 India A.I.R. Manual 127 (5th ed.
1989).  In this Act, gifts or presents made to either party at marriage were not consid-
ered dowry unless they were made “as consideration for the marriage of said parties.”
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bridal home by contributing to the financial stability of the household
and also protects her from indigence in case her husband dies or aban-
dons her.52  If the court had a proper understanding of the function of
a dowry, it is not clear that the dowry agreement would have been ren-
dered unenforceable.  Bride price, on the other hand, is barter for the
bride, who is attributed with a cash value and purchased at a (negoti-
ated) price.  It would be contrary to public policy if the bride were pur-
chased and payment deferred.
There is no indication, however, that the payment functioned as a
bride price.  The payment appeared to be a security measure for the
bride in case the marriage dissolved (and hence, “deferred”).  There is
further support for the view that the court misunderstood “dowry” as
“bride price”: the court opinion writes “dowry for the bride,” as in pay-
ment in exchange for the bride (emphasis added).53 The proper
description would have been “dowry from the bride,” as in goods con-
tributed to the marriage from the bride’s family.54  It seems plausible
that the court believed that enforcing a contract that provides for cash
in exchange for the bride would amount to recognizing her as an
object to be purchased.  An enforcement of the contract would demean
her dignity and fail to treat her with equal concern and respect.
It should be noted that the woman not only agreed to the dowry
contract but that she was the party seeking its enforcement.55  The
court seems to have believed that her voluntary consent failed to give
effect to the contract because its provisions undermined her moral sta-
tus.  The court’s judgment in Jabri is not the only approach to moral
equality in the context of marriage contracts.  In another case, Odatalla
v. Odatalla, a New Jersey Muslim-American couple married in a relig-
ious ceremony.56  Prior to the ceremony, the families negotiated the
terms of the Islamic marriage license, including the dowry agreement,
which provided the following: “According to Islamic Law Dower is:
Prompt One golden pound coin[.] Postponed Ten Thousand U.S. Dollars.”57
A videotape was submitted as evidence: “Each party read the entire
license and Mahr [dowry] Agreement and signed the same freely and
voluntarily.”58  When the marriage fell apart and the wife claimed the
dowry, the issue was not the court’s refusal to enforce the contract but
the husband’s claim that the court could not order the performance of
the dowry agreement on two grounds: “(1) the First Amendment to the
Constitution precludes this court’s authority to review the Mahr Agree-
ment under the separation of Church and State Doctrine and (2) the
52. A.S. ALTEKAR, THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN HINDU CIVILIZATION 71–72 (3d ed.
1978).
53. Jabri, 108 S.W.3d at 407.
54. For explanations of the historical change in marriage practices and the distinc-
tion between brideprice and dowry, see Diane Owen Hughes, From Brideprice To Dowry in
Mediterranean Europe 3 J. FAM. HIST. 262 (1978).
55. Id.
56. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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agreement is not a valid contract under New Jersey law.”59  The Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey found that enforcing the contract did not
infringe upon free exercise rights under the First Amendment because
the court could apply “neutral principles of law” to determine enforce-
ability and need not rely on religious doctrine.60  Further, the court
found that “[c]learly, the Mahr [dowry] Agreement in the case at bar is
nothing more and nothing less than a simple contract between two con-
senting adults.  It does not contravene any statute or interests of
society.”61
The disagreement between the two courts on the enforceability of
dowry contracts reflects different approaches to moral equality.  The
Jabri court believed that the recognition of the woman’s equal moral
status should be given priority over other considerations, and by impli-
cation, refused to give effect to a contract that treated the woman as a
commodity with a purchase value.  Based on a correct understanding of
the significance of the dowry, however, the Jabri court might not have
rendered the dowry contract invalid.  On the other hand, the Odatalla
court recognized the woman’s equal moral status by protecting her vol-
untary choices.  The court’s judgment points out that the moral signifi-
cance of autonomy lies in the value of the choice itself rather than what
is chosen.  Respect for autonomy requires the courts to operate on the
presumption that rational and mature persons have the capacity to
exercise autonomy based on their considered beliefs, values, and inter-
ests.  The courts have an obligation to give effect to agreements that
result from the exercise of autonomy, unless the presumption of
rational capacity can be overridden.  In a liberal democratic society, the
courts should give high priority to the protection of autonomy, given
that equal concern and respect for citizens is based on their rational
capacity to govern their lives according to their beliefs, values, and
interests.
III. UNSUSTAINABLE USE: PROTECTION PRINCIPLE
We now return to the case introduced at the beginning of this
Essay.  A Muslim couple married in Morocco and moved to New Jersey
in 2008 for the husband’s employment.62  After three months of mar-
riage, the husband’s physical abuse against his wife led up repeated
instances of rape.  The case went to trial and the court did not find that
sexual assault or criminal sexual conduct had been proven:
This court does not feel that, under the circumstances, that this
defendant had a criminal desire to or intent to sexually assault or
to sexually contact the plaintiff when he did.  The court believes
that he was operating under his belief that it is, as the husband,
his desire to have sex when and whether he wanted to, was some-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 95–96.
61. Id. at 98.
62. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
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thing that was consistent with his practices and it was something
that was not prohibited.63
The trial court’s decision was reversed on appeal, pointing out “the
responsibility of the courts to protect victims of such violence . . . .”64
The courts are instruments of the State, which is a protective agent
for the victims of crime.65  In the case above, M.J.R., the trial court’s
appeal to Islamic practices to determine that the husband did not com-
mit a sexual crime amounts to the State’s denial of the responsibility to
protect individuals from physical harm within its borders.  The harm
that results from coerced sex—even if it is permitted under Islamic
law—reaches beyond the protected sphere of noncitizens.  It was
argued in the previous section that the protected sphere of noncitizens
is larger than that of citizens; that is, more activities should be guarded
against governmental interference for noncitizens because they do not
enjoy a relation of reciprocity with the State.  While the lack of reciproc-
ity limits the State’s use of power over the noncitizen’s right to control
his or her own life, the activities that result in third-party physical harm
are excluded from the protected sphere of both citizens and
noncitizens.
Reciprocity between the State and perpetrator is not always rele-
vant to the question of whether the State is authorized to interfere in a
matter.  That is, a special relationship between the coercer and the
coerced is not always necessary for the legitimate use of force.  As an
analogy, a parent who is looking after her own child on a playground
also has the responsibility to prevent harm to other children to the
extent that she is able, even if she does not have a special relationship
with the other children.  Likewise, the State has the duty to protect all
persons—citizens and noncitizens—within its borders.  The State
claims jurisdiction over activities within its geographical territory; citi-
zens and noncitizens may be coerced or punished for actions over
which the State, qua protective agent, has a compelling interest.  Unsus-
tainable uses of Islamic law in American courts undermine not merely
some rights of Muslim persons but their most basic right to physical
security.  The courts have an obligation not to use Islamic law if it would
result in the failure to discharge the duties of a protective agent.
A State’s territorial jurisdiction over persons and activities per-
formed within its borders does not imply that it has exclusive authority
over them, as argued in the previous Part.66  The United States shares
with other States both the right to rule over and the responsibility to
protect noncitizens.  American courts work with foreign courts to dis-
charge their duty to protect, which may involve enforcing foreign judg-
ments.  State courts routinely defer to foreign courts, unless their
63. Id. (citing unpublished trial court opinion).
64. Id. at 426.
65. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26–53 (1st ed. 1974).
66. See supra Part II.
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judgment contradicts American public policy.67  Call this the “public
policy constraint” on comity.  Anti-Sharia laws place a further con-
straint, the “rights constraint” on comity, which prohibits the recogni-
tion of foreign judicial acts that violate a litigant’s constitutional and
legal rights.68  While adding the rights constraint might help U.S.
courts in meeting their obligation to protect noncitizens, the courts can
nonetheless fail to discharge their duty to protect even if the two comity
constraints were satisfied.  That is, the non-enforcement of foreign
judgments that contradict public policy or violate rights does not
amount to sufficient constraints on comity.  With the following case as
an example, I will argue that the duty to protect requires in some cases
the refusal to recognize a judgment rendered by a foreign jurisdiction
that fails to protect basic rights, even if the judgment itself does not
contradict public policy or violate rights.  This additional constraint on
comity—call it the “jurisdiction constraint”—would require a higher
number of foreign judgments to be barred from enforcement in U.S.
courts.  However, the courts should satisfy the jurisdiction constraint if
they take seriously the responsibility to protect the physical security of
noncitizens residing within the United States.
Hosain v. Malik was a custody dispute between Pakistani parents for
the sole custody of their daughter.69  Both mother and father were
Pakistani citizens and their daughter was born in Pakistan.  In 1990,
after eight years of marriage, the mother fled Pakistan with the child
and resided in Maryland with a man with whom she had a son.  The
father filed for custody of the daughter, but the mother refused to obey
the Pakistani court order, which required her to return to Pakistan with
the daughter for a custody hearing.  When the father was granted cus-
tody in a Pakistani court, he attempted to enforce the court order by
locating the mother and daughter in Maryland, where the mother also
filed for sole custody.  The circuit court granted comity to the Pakistani
court order that gave sole custody to the father.  The Special Appeals
Court affirmed the decision, stating that the Pakistani court did not
presumptively privilege the father in custody rulings, but rather, the
“best interest of the child standard is the law in Pakistan in child cus-
tody disputes.”70  Further, “substantial evidence before the circuit court
indicated that the Pakistani courts in fact applied the best interest of
the child standard” in this particular case.71
It might appear that the Maryland courts satisfied the principle of
protection—i.e., the State should protect the physical security of all per-
67. In one case, the Court of Appeals in Washington state refused to enforce an
Iranian custody order on grounds that Iranian law “contradicts the strong public policy of
Washington.”  In re Marriage of Donboli, 128 Wash. App. 1039, 1039 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005).
68. In Tarikonda, the Appellate Court stated, “To accord comity to a system that
denies equal protection would ignore the rights of citizens and persons under the protec-
tion of Michigan’s laws.”  Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, slip op. at 4 (Mich. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2009).
69. Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 999 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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sons within its borders—by granting comity based on the relative con-
formity between Maryland and Pakistani courts, which are both guided
by the interests of the child in custody cases.  However, in granting com-
ity to the Pakistani court, the Maryland courts failed to consider the
proper scope of application for the principle of protection.  The rea-
soning of the Pakistani court in granting sole custody to the father was
in part the mother’s failure to appear at the custody hearing and pro-
duce the child as ordered.72  Her return to Pakistan for the hearing,
however, would have involved a high risk of danger for her physical
security.  The Pakistani State does not consistently protect women’s
physical security.  Pakistan is considered one of the most dangerous
places in the world for women; more than 1,000 women and girls are
murdered in “honor killings” every year and ninety percent of women
suffer domestic violence.73  In the case above, the husband and his fam-
ily might have inflicted physical harm against the wife for conceiving a
child with another man.  Or the woman’s own family might have
inflicted harm on her for having disgraced her family.74  These acts
would be culturally condoned in Pakistan.  If the widespread violence
against women in Pakistani society were considered, then the Maryland
courts might have taken a different approach to the case.  By deferring
to a foreign jurisdiction that fails to enforce women’s basic right to
physical security, granting comity was unsustainable in the case.75
The U.S. courts have at least two options in enforcing foreign judg-
ments.  The courts might refuse to enforce (1) only judgments that are
contrary to U.S. public policy or violate federal or state constitutional
rights or (2) all judgments rendered by foreign jurisdictions that do not
protect rights similar to U.S. federal or state constitutional rights,
regardless of whether the judgment itself is contrary to public policy or
violates rights.  Under (1), the Maryland court’s decision to grant com-
ity in the custody case would be sustainable.  The court satisfied both
the public policy and rights constraints on comity.  The Pakistani judg-
ment was based on the welfare of the child and ordering the mother’s
appearance at the hearing did not result in any actual rights violations
against her.  By refusing to return to Pakistan, she took precaution and
did not suffer physical harm.
On the other hand, the court’s decision would be unsustainable
under (2).  The decision to grant comity to a foreign jurisdiction that
72. Id.
73. Zara Jamal, To Be a Woman in Pakistan: Six Stories of Abuse, Shame, and Survival,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2012, 7:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2012/04/to-be-a-woman-in-pakistan-six-stories-of-abuse-shame-and-survival/255585/.
74. Jon Boone, Pakistani wife in disputed marriage gunned down in court by her brother,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/05/
pakistani-wife-marriage-brother; Pakistani couple arrested over acid attack on daughter, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20199989.
75. According to Amar Sindhu, a professor of philosophy at Sindh University and a
women’s rights activist, the violence against women is better explained by “the complete
absence of the rule of law” rather than social and cultural practices. See Boone, supra note
65; Pakistani women sentenced to death by cleric, alive and well, court told, AL ARABIYA NEWS
(Jun. 7, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/07/219186.html.
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does not enforce the basic right to physical security can result in the
failure to discharge the duty to protect all persons within U.S. borders.
The jurisdiction constraint proposed here is weaker than (2), however.
The non-recognition of foreign jurisdictions that fail to enforce the
basic right to physical security is less demanding than non-recognition
of jurisdictions that fail to enforce the full range of U.S. constitutional
rights.  Implementing (2) would most likely result in limiting comity to
a handful of foreign jurisdictions at most, whereas a weaker version of
(2) that recognizes only jurisdictions that protect basic rights would be
instrumental to discharging the duty to protect.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argued that the use of Islamic law in American courts
should be guided by principles rather than strictly prohibited or permit-
ted without clear constraints.  While the advocates of the Sharia ban
claim that the courts should be prohibited from using Islamic law
because it violates litigants’ rights, the cases examined show that the
ban can lead to the same result.  To avoid the absurd consequences of a
total ban or an unrestricted permission, this paper distinguished three
categories of Sharia use in state courts based on three principles.  A
good use of Islamic law is compatible with—or further supports—a fed-
eral or state constitutional right, and in particular, the right to religious
liberty.  In a liberal democratic society, the commitment to equal con-
cern and respect requires neutral institutions that do not privilege or
discriminate against a particular religious doctrine.  Institutional neu-
trality that requires non-interference in ecclesiastical disputes requires
the courts to consider a religious doctrine by recognizing it as the
proper source of authority for the governance of a religious
organization.
A bad use of Islamic law undermines a constitutional right; how-
ever, the use is not unsustainable.  The courts should be given discre-
tion in cases where there are important considerations that may
obligate the courts to use Islamic law.  For example, the authority of
liberal institutions should be limited in adjudicating a range of disputes
between noncitizens because they do not enjoy a relation of reciprocity
with the State.  That is, a legitimate democratic institution operates
within a relation of reciprocity between the State and citizens in which
the State respects citizens’ equal rights, and citizens respect the author-
ity of the State’s coercive institutions.  Unlike citizens who enjoy the
right to political participation and shape coercive institutions, nonci-
tizens are not granted the same right and lack the opportunity to
impose their values on the same institutions.  The State should exercise
restraint in its use of power over individuals who are not granted the
full range of constitutional rights.
Finally, a court’s unsustainable use of Islamic law results in the fail-
ure to deliver the primary responsibility of the State, i.e., the protection
of all individuals within its geographical borders.  In cases where the
use of Islamic law poses a high risk in the violation of a person’s right to
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 159 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 159 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE107.txt unknown Seq: 21  2-MAY-14 7:02
2014] ISLAMIC LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 307
physical security, the relation of reciprocity between the State and the
individual becomes irrelevant to the question of whether State interven-
tion is authorized.
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